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An Epistemic Modal Norm of Practical Reasoning 
 
Tim Henning, University of Mainz 
 
 
In a decision where much hangs on whether p, it would be irresponsible to simply guess that p and 
proceed. Thus, many people agree that there is an epistemic norm of practical reasoning: To justifiably 
rely on p in practical reasoning, one needs to be positioned well enough, epistemically, to do so.  
One much-discussed candidate norm is the Knowledge Norm. Two standard formulations: 
 
“One knows q iff q is an appropriate premise for one’s practical reasoning.” (Williamson 
2005, 231) 
 
“Treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting only if you know that p.” (Hawthorne 
and Stanley 2008, 577) 
 
These formulations differ on a number of counts. The first, unlike the second, is a biconditional. 
When I speak of the Knowledge Norm here, I mean to refer to a conditional version, according to 
which knowledge is necessary in order for it to be proper to treat something as a practical reason. 
The formulations also differ in that one is about treating p as a premise in practical reasoning, the 
other about treating p as a reason for acting. I will assume that these pretty much come to the same 
thing. My own preferred formulation, by the way, will be about relying on p in practical reasoning. 
The Knowledge Norm is not the only candidate, though. Other proposals abound, like a 
Justified-Belief-that-One-Knows Norm (Neta 2009), a Justified-True-Belief Norm (Littlejohn 2009 
and 2012), a Warrant Norm (Gerken 2011), or a Sensitive-Belief Norm (Enoch, Fisher and Spectre 
2012). Also, there is the related debate about the norm of assertion. While it is not clear that both 
domains require a common norm, some norms from the latter debate might be proposed as 
practical norms, too. One candidate would be a Safe-Belief Norm (Pritchard 2014). Finally, there 
is the Truth Norm (defended for assertion in Weiner 2005). While maybe it should not be called 
an epistemic norm, it may come with a “secondary” norm which is epistemic. (More on this later.) 
This paper first criticizes all current proposals (except for the Truth Norm). It claims that 
they violate a plausible constraint that I label Transparency. I then propose an alternative epistemic 
norm. This norm captures much of the intuitive plausibility of other candidates, but it avoids the 
violation of Transparency. In this respect, it resembles the Truth Norm. Unlike the latter, however, 
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it is an epistemic norm in a narrow sense, and it does not count lucky guesses as proper on any 
level. The norm proposed contains, not a description of an epistemic condition of the reasoner or 
her evidence but an epistemic modal. It says: Rely on p in practical reasoning only if it must be that 
p.1 
Roadmap: §§ 1 and 2 describe two problems for existing proposals, the problems of Negative 
Bootstrapping and of Level Confusions. § 3 offers a general diagnosis, tracing the two problems 
to a violation of Transparency. § 4 introduces the alternative norm. § 5 discusses Non-Factualism 
about epistemic modals. § 6 clarifies the proposal. And §7 adds to the proposal an associated norm 
of “secondary propriety”, which again is a modal norm. §8 briefly discusses reasons which contain 
epistemic and probability operators. § 9 concludes with another brief look at the role of knowledge. 
 
 
1. The Problem of Negative Bootstrapping 
 
The first problem concerns those candidate epistemic norms which specify conditions that entail 
belief in the proposition at issue (or, indeed, belief in related propositions, see below). Arguably, 
these candidates include the Knowledge Norm, the Justified-Belief-One-Knows Norm, the 
Justified-True-Belief Norm, the Sensitive-Belief Norm, etc. These all entail that an irrational failure 
to believe can affect the balance of reasons that we can properly rely on, in ways that seem absurd. 
Suppose my evidence strongly suggests that a good friend is in trouble, in which case I should 
go and look after him. Doing so would cause me some inconvenience, but nothing too serious. 
Suppose also that I cannot bear the thought that my friend is in trouble, so I am in denial. Despite 
the evidence I irrationally cling to the belief that all is well. Now, presumably, since I fail to believe 
that my friend is in trouble, I do not know it (or justifiably believe it, or believe I know it) either. 
So according to the above norms, I am not permitted to treat this proposition as a reason. We can 
imagine that the same goes for related propositions, such as that it is likely that my friend is in 
trouble, or even that there is a non-trivial chance that he is in trouble. These are all thoughts I could 
not bear, so I fail to believe them either. Again, the above norms entail that I am not in a position 
to treat any of these considerations as reasons. In consequence, it may well be that the balance of 
																																																								
1 I will take the liberty to sometimes use letters like p and q in the grammatical role of singular terms for propositions 
(as in “rely on p”) and to sometimes use them in the grammatical role of sentences (“it must be that p”). I trust that 
no serious confusion will be caused by this, and I apologize to those whose aesthetic sense is offended. 
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those reasons that I can take into account tells against going to see my friend.2 Thus I affect what 
reasons I should take into account, and so what my reasons support, by an irrational failure to believe. 
This is a problem, however. Here is why. It is uncontroversial, I take it, that my failure to 
believe in accord with my strong evidence is an epistemic irrationality. But I also think that my 
decision not to look after my friend is a practical failure. (My evidence suggests that he is in severe 
trouble, and all I do is to try to ignore it as best I can!) Alas, the candidate epistemic norms make 
it hard to vindicate this latter judgment. Again, due to my failure to believe, I am allegedly not in a 
position to treat the proposition that my friend is in trouble (or the proposition that it is likely that 
he is, etc.) as a reason. And without such reasons to rely on, there may simply be nothing left that 
could direct me to the conclusion that I am to go and look after my friend. So how am I at fault? 
This is a mirror image of what has come to be known as the bootstrapping problem in the 
debate on requirements of rationality. Many authors observe that a requirement of enkrasia seems 
to entail that by believing that there is reason for one to do something, one makes it the case that 
there is reason for one to do it (see Broome 1999, Kolodny 2005). Here, we find a similar absurdity: 
Just as one should not be able to create reasons by believing in them, one should not be able to get 
rid of them by irrationally failing to believe in them! This is the Problem of Negative Bootstrapping. 
A word about the structure of the argument:3 The basic intuition is that all things considered, 
I ought to rely and act on the reason that my friend is in trouble. But epistemic norms of reasoning 
formulate permissions to rely on reasons, not requirements. So how does the argument go? It uses 
a principle that seems plausible: If a consideration is not epistemically accessible to a subject (in 
the sense that it is not epistemically permissible for her to rely on it), it cannot be true that she still 
ought to rely on it, all things considered. This principle is then used in a modus tollens. Again, it seems 
wrong for me not to rely on the reason that my friend is in trouble. Hence it cannot be true that 
this fact is not epistemically accessible. And therefore, norms that claim otherwise are problematic. 
Let me repeat that this problem is not at all specific to the Knowledge Norm. It arises for 
many weaker proposals as well – in effect, for any norm that includes the component of belief. 
Notice that such a belief component can be an implicit part of some norms. For instance, consider 
norms that merely demand that one have a particular amount of evidence. On most accounts, 
having evidence requires certain psychological states or responses as well, whether it be knowledge 
(as in Williamson 2000) or something else. And these states, again, seem to entail belief. So once 
again this opens up the possibility of getting rid of practical reasons by irrational failures to believe. 
																																																								
2 Of course, the proposition that my friend is okay is not among these reasons either. The idea is that I have other reasons 
to do other things, which I may rely on, and lack permission to rely on any particular views about my friend. 
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting this clarification. 
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This discussion bears some similarities to J. Lackey’s (2007) critical discussion of the 
knowledge norm of assertion. Lackey also argues that an unwarranted failure to believe should not 
make it any less proper to assert certain things. She holds that in the cases she presents, subjects 
ought to make certain assertions despite lack of belief in them – “selfless assertions,” as she calls 
them. Echoing Lackey, my point is this: In the above example, I should engage in selfless reasoning.   
Maybe there are quick fixes? Maybe knowledge does not require belief (Radford 1966)? Or 
maybe I do believe that my friend is in trouble in the relevant sense (Gendler 2008)? For one thing, 
these would be surprisingly controversial commitments, attached to prominent theories of 
epistemic norms. For another, they would not take care of a second problem, to be discussed now. 
In fact, as I will argue, these ‘fixes’ for the first problem may render the second one more pressing.  
A different kind of fix would, of course, be to turn to versions of an epistemic norm which 
are de-psychologized, i.e. which do not require any actual responses on the part of the reasoner. 
Examples might be norms that require a certain amount of available evidence (whether or not one 
actually possesses or responds to it) or some such. But these too fall prey to the second problem.    
 
 
2. The Problem of Level Confusion 
 
The second problem is this: Typical candidates for epistemic norms make us vulnerable to 
“philosophical” doubts, doubts that are intuitively irrelevant. To see this, we must introduce the 
distinction of “primary” and “secondary propriety” (to use the terminology of DeRose 2002, 180). 
To begin, none of the conditions specified by typical epistemic norms are luminous (in the 
sense of Williamson 2000). None of them specify conditions such that, whenever a subject is in 
that condition, she is in a position to know that this is so. This raises questions: What about subjects 
who satisfy the condition specified by the norm but who faultlessly fail to realize that this is so? 
Conversely, what if a subject fails to satisfy the condition but reasonably takes herself to satisfy it? 
Many authors (e.g., DeRose 2009, Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, Williamson 2000) introduce 
a “secondary” or “derived” norm to deal with these questions. This secondary norm specifies what 
we may expect from a subject who tries to guide herself by the primary norm, under what 
conditions such a subject can be excused for breaching the primary norm, when she deserves 




If a norm says that one ought to rely on that p only if condition c holds, one is reasonable 
(with regard to that norm) in relying on that p iff one has justification to believe that c 
holds.4 
 
So if we take the Knowledge Norm, the idea would be that a subject who knows p may satisfy the 
Knowledge Norm but still be unreasonable in relying on p, because she is not justified in believing 
she knows p. In this case, she would deserve a certain kind of criticism or blame, even though she 
was correct to rely on p. Conversely, someone may be justified in believing she knows that p even 
though in fact she does not. In this case, she is not permitted to rely on p as a reason, and if she 
does, she needs an excuse. But there will be an excuse: she was justified in believing she knew p.5 
I agree that epistemic norms should come with a secondary norm of reasonableness. Some 
authors (Lackey 2007, Kvanvig 2009) oppose the idea, claiming that there should be only one norm 
governing all of our responses. I discuss some of their objections below. As I will argue, these 
authors, too, have a point. Indeed, one salient feature of the epistemic norm I will propose is that 
the distinction collapses in certain cases (especially in first-person contexts) but not in other cases. 
Now, imagine a variation of our case in which my response to my evidence about my friend 
is impeccable. I do believe he is in trouble, as I should. But a philosopher approaches me and asks: 
“I see that you are sure that your friend is in trouble. And I do not mean to doubt that he is. But 
are you sure your state satisfies the concept of knowledge?” In reply, I do not just need to produce 
evidence about my friend. I need higher-order evidence about it, showing that I am justified in 
																																																								
4 Many proponents of secondary norms (like DeRose 2009, Weiner 2005) require justified (or “reasonable”) belief. But 
this creates some unclarity. In their presentations, one is reasonable if one justifiably believes one satisfies the primary 
norm, and one is not reasonable if one believes one does not satisfy it. This, however, raises the question of how to 
deal with cases in which one lacks either belief. I think the most plausible way to generalize the norm to cover these 
cases makes justification central. A further advantage of this version of a secondary norm is that it makes fewer 
demands regarding the presence of higher order beliefs. 
5 In what follows, I assume that a secondary norm is tied closely to our ordinary understanding of when agents are 
reasonable, or deserve blame etc. After all, the purpose of DeRose’s distinction and similar proposals is precisely to 
accommodate our ordinary intuitions about when agents do not assert or reason with full propriety. Admittedly, there 
has been some debate about the nature of secondary propriety, in particular concerning whether it is a technical notion 
or intended to capture intuitive judgments. As I see it, this debate arises from problems regarding the Knowledge 
Norm in particular. Many authors have argued that subjects who have a true, justified, but Gettiered belief that p do 
not need an excuse when they rely on p or assert p (see Douven 2006; Brown 2008, Kvanvig 2009, Schechter 2017). 
So whatever secondary propriety amounts to in these cases, it cannot be to provide an excuse (though see Littlejohn 
2012). I think that this is a reason to doubt the Knowledge Norm, and not a reason to employ a technical and 
revisionary notion of secondary propriety. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this issue.   
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believing that my first-order evidence is good evidence. Also, I will have to defend claims about 
knowledge – maybe that fallibilism is true and that brain-in-a-vat scenarios may properly be ignored.   
When encountering these calls for justification, I may not waver in my first-order conviction 
that my friend is in trouble. But I may doubt whether my position vis-à-vis this claim is knowledge. 
In any case, the conclusion may be that I lack the justification to believe that I have knowledge. 
Now, assuming that the epistemic norm comes with a secondary norm like Reasonableness, 
this should directly affect my willingness to rely on the proposition that my friend is in trouble. After 
all, to be reasonable in relying on the proposition that he is in trouble, I not only have to be in a certain 
epistemic position with regard to this proposition; I also need the justification to believe the higher-
order proposition that I am in the right epistemic position with regard to the proposition that my friend is in 
trouble. Since epistemic positions are not luminous, these two conditions can come apart. Hence I 
might find myself staying home, not because of any uncertainty regarding my friend’s need but 
because, say, I lack a compelling defense of fallibilism. According to the norms, this would be 
reasonable: I would be excused for not going to support my friend; I might deserve blame if I did. 
In a classic paper (Alston 1980), W. Alston has observed that certain positions and arguments 
in epistemology involve or invite what he calls level confusions. The latter occur when we should be 
debating whether p but instead wind up debating a higher-level question, such as whether 
somebody knows that p or has evidence that p, etc. Given non-luminosity, propositions on different 
levels require different kinds and amounts of justifying evidence (importantly, even in the first-
person case), hence level confusions can be harmful. My point is that given the available proposals 
of epistemic practical norms, reasonableness will make us prone to epistemic level confusions.  
Hence I call this the Problem of Level Confusions. Let me return to a point I made earlier. 
In response to the Problem of Negative Bootstrapping, I said that controversial assumptions about 
knowledge or belief might fix it. But I added that these fixes, in addition to their controversial 
nature, may render the present problem (i.e. the Problem of Level Confusions) worse. We can now 
see why: If the epistemic norm requires a controversial account of core epistemic concepts, this is 
all the more food for “philosophical” doubt. For what reasonableness will require now is not just 
good higher-order evidence, an argument for fallibilism, etc. – but also a defense of a controversial 
account of knowledge (like Radford’s) or of a controversial account of belief (like Gendler’s), etc. 
So return to the previous example, in which I irrationally refuse to believe that my friend is 
in trouble. Of course, adopting Gendler’s or Radford’s proposals would make it easier to defend 
the correct conclusion that I should go to the aid of my friend. In what sense might it make the 
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present problem, i.e. the Problem of Level Confusions, worse?6 It would turn the example into 
another case where a practical issue turns on intuitively irrelevant questions of philosophical 
doctrine. Our theory should not predict that in the decision whether to go to my friend, there is a 
relevant and legitimate doubt that requires an account like Radford’s or Gendler’s to be alleviated.   
I also mentioned earlier that, in response to the Problem of Negative Bootstrapping one may 
turn towards de-psychologized constraints. E.g., one might say that the correct epistemic norm is 
really about evidence that is available (although not necessarily had, see above). It might say that 
one must treat p as a practical reason only if knowledge-level evidence for p is available – i.e., only 
if one is in a position to know p, whatever one’s actual state is. Now, the problem with these 
proposals is that the elimination of belief does not eliminate the epistemological sophistication. 
And hence the Problem of Level Confusions persists. After all, reasonableness in acting on this 
norm will now require justified belief about which evidence is available, about what it means for 
evidence to be available, about when available evidence is knowledge-level, etc. Interesting as these 
questions may be, it is simply implausible that I am reasonable in staying home, with my conviction 
that my friend is in trouble fully and justifiably intact, just because I lack arguments in epistemology.  
As I said at the beginning of this section, some authors eschew the distinction of primary 
and secondary propriety. Lackey, for example, claims that the distinction is “spurious.” On her 
view, if I do not satisfy an epistemic norm (of assertion, in her case) but reasonably believe that I 
do, I am blameless and have an excuse – but that does not have to mean that there must be another 
norm according to which the assertion was in some sense a proper assertion after all. With this, I 
disagree. Following Kvanvig (2010), I think that norms of this kind (i.e., norms of assertion and of 
practical reasoning) play one of their most important roles in the “egocentric predicament” of 
deciding what to say, and what to treat as a reason, oneself. Here, they must provide guidance. But 
if we cannot generally expect subjects to grasp whether they satisfy whatever epistemic norm we 
are proposing, we have to allow that these subjects guide themselves by other rules in answering 
these questions. And if these other rules play this legitimate guiding function, surely they deserve 
to be called norms of assertion and practical reasoning at least as much as the norms we propose. 
Kvanvig, too, rejects the primary/secondary norm distinction. As indicated, he invokes the 
“egocentric predicament”, claiming that it does not make sense to guide oneself by both primary 
and secondary norms at once. His proposal is a norm that is, in a sense, luminous after all. He 
proposes a norm of assertion according to which asserting that p is epistemically proper only if the 
speaker’s perspective provides epistemic justification for p. Epistemic justification is defined as the 
																																																								
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this question. 
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kind of justification required to turn true, non-Gettiered belief into knowledge. And Kvanvig 
claims that it obeys an iteration principle to the effect that that p is epistemically justified for a 
subject only if that p is epistemically justified for that subject is epistemically justified for her, and so on.  
Unfortunately, this account runs into the same problem. In Kvanvig’s view, a subject has 
epistemic justification for p only if her evidence for p and the rest of her total knowledge confirm, 
not just that p is justified to some high degree but that the justification enjoyed by p is epistemic, i.e., 
knowledge-level.7 But the question of when justification is knowledge-level is philosophically 
contested. Kvanvig, e.g., denies fallibilism and therefore argues that the subject’s total evidence 
must be sufficient to confirm that all further inquiry will support p. He also claims that such 
epistemic justification is accessible in the strong sense that there can be no Williamson-style anti-
luminosity argument against it. Accordingly, we will be justified in believing that we have epistemic 
justification only if we are justified in a particular conception of knowledge-level justification. So we will again 
be open to philosophical doubts, although in this case it is due to the suggested primary norm.8 
I tentatively conclude that this way of avoiding the Problem of Level Confusions is blocked. 
 
 
3. A General Diagnosis: Lack of Transparency 
 
Let me attempt a general diagnosis: As an agent, my ultimate practical aim must be to go or stay 
depending on whether or not my friend is in trouble. Therefore, I will be willing to guide myself 
by an epistemic norm only if I am confident that it accords with this aim. My ambition to go and 
see my friend iff he is in trouble and my ambition to conform to epistemic norms should not conflict. 
This, I think, is the common core of the Problems of Negative Bootstrapping and of Level 
Confusions. In the former case, the fact that I fail to form the relevant belief does not do anything 
to make it more or less likely that my friend is in trouble. In the latter case, the truth of fallibilism 
also seems independent of the question of whether my friend is in trouble. (At any rate, if fallibilism 
is supposed to be false, that should shake my confidence that I know that he is in trouble to a far 
greater extent than it shakes my confidence that he is in fact in trouble.) Therefore, the epistemic 
norms impose conditions that seem like irrelevant obstacles from the point of view of what matters.  
																																																								
7 Kvanvig insists on this because he thinks that his norm should provide an explanation of Moorean sentences like “P, 
but I do not know that P” (which figure prominently in defenses of the knowledge norm, see Williamson 2000).    
8 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to elaborate on the objection to Kvanvig. 
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A related point is pressed by Enoch, Fisher and Spectre in work on epistemic norms as 
standards of proof in criminal law. They discuss the proposal that statistical evidence may be 
inadmissible because it does not ground knowledge, and knowledge is the relevant epistemic norm: 
 
“But why should the law of evidence care about knowledge or about epistemology more 
generally? […] Let us emphasize that to insist that the law should after all care about 
knowledge is (pretty much) to be willing to pay a price in accuracy. Indeed, excluding 
statistical evidence amounts to excluding (what is often) good, genuinely probative 
evidence. And this means that the legal value of knowledge – if it has legal value, and if that 
value is what grounds the differential treatment of statistical and individual evidence – 
sometimes outweighs the value of accuracy, that, in other words, in order to make sure that 
courts base their ruling on knowledge, we are willing to tolerate more mistakes than we 
otherwise would have to, and indeed a higher probability of mistake on this or that specific 
case. This just seems utterly implausible.” (Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre 2012, 16) 
 
This is not a paper on the philosophy of the criminal law, of course. But the worry I mean to press 
in this section is similar to the worry expressed in this quote. (Note that the authors make it clear 
that the issue is not just about “the long run”, but also about single cases.) Let me be more precise. 
Take Hawthorne and Stanley’s definition of p-dependence: 
 
“Let us say that a choice between options x1...xn is p dependent iff the most preferable of 
x1....xn conditional on the proposition that p is not the same as the most preferable of 
x1...xn conditional on the proposition that not-p.” (2008, 578) 
 
Assuming that rational agents aim to minimize opportunity costs, my ambition in a p-dependent 
choice must therefore be to perform the act that is best, given that p, iff p. More officially, it is this: 
 
 Practical Aim: Perform the act that is best, given that p,  iff  p. 
 
Now we may further assume that in the cases at hand, sound reasoning will lead the agent to 
perform the act that is best, given that p, iff the agent relies on p. (This would mean that no weaker 
premise would suffice to lead her to perform the relevant act.) Then my aim will also include this: 
 
 Accuracy:  Rely on p     iff  p. 
 
Clearly, this coincides with the Truth Norm. Thus, from the point of view of our practical aims, 
we must wish that in fact, whether we know it or not, we conform to the Truth Norm. Does this 
mean that the Truth Norm is correct? This does not follow. Compare: In discussions of practical 
rationality, many people deny that the correct norm tells us: “Do what has the best consequences!”, 
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even though this is in some sense our aim. Instead, many think that the correct norm tells us to do 
what is likely to lead to the best consequences, given our evidence or rational credence. Similarly, 
although our aim is to rely on p iff p, the correct norm may tell us to rely on p only if this is most 
likely to lead to the best consequences, given our evidence. In other words, the correct primary 
norm for relying on p may require that our evidence support p, or something the like. And like 
many others, I do think that some such proposal better captures our intuitions about relying on p. 
I think Practical Aim and Accuracy suggest a condition of adequacy for epistemic norms. It 
is this: Epistemic norms of practical reasoning should not impose constraints on relying on p that 
are, in some sense, independent of whether p. They should not lead us to ask questions that do not 
pertain to the likelihood of p, lest they impose what we must see as irrelevant and harmful barriers. 
In the examples, this is what happens if I do not go to support my friend because I am uncertain 
of some epistemological claim, or because I recognize an irrational failure to believe on my part. 
This can lead to the following condition of adequacy: 
 
 Transparency 
 A norm N accords with my aim (to rely on p iff p), only if according to N,  
(i) any consideration that counts against relying on p also counts against p being true, and 
does the former because it does the latter, and 
(ii) any consideration that counts in favor of relying on p also counts in favor of p being 
true, and does the former because	it does the latter. 
 
If this holds, I will say that according to norm N, the question of whether to rely on p is transparent 
to the question of whether p. I will also call the epistemic norm N itself transparent in this case. 
There are other ways to formulate the transparency idea. Here is one in terms of credence: 
 
 Transparency, Probabilistic Version: 
Let N be an epistemic norm for relying on p in practical reasoning, and let P be the 
probability measure that gives the reasoner’s rational credence. Let c be the condition that 
N imposes on relying on p. Then N is transparent iff for any consideration e, differences 
between P(c | e) and P(c) are explained by appeal to differences between P(p | e) and P(p). 
 
In other words: Whatever (dis-)confirms that p can be relied on must do so by (dis-)confirming that p. 
I give this alternative formulation to make it clear that I am concerned with the general idea rather 
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than with the details of a particular formulation. (In fact, it is debatable whether my own proposed 
norm satisfies the Probabilistic Version. On some semantic views it does, on others it does not.) 
Transparency is supported by the above examples. If I realize that I fail to believe what my 
evidence supports, this has strong impact on my credence in that I know without necessarily 
affecting my credence in that my friend is in trouble. Likewise, higher-order evidence and controversial 
epistemological hypotheses affect my credence in propositions about my epistemic state in a way 
that is stronger, and not fully explained by, their impact on my credence in that my friend is in trouble. 
My presentation ties the condition Transparency to practical aims. It is only if a norm is 
transparent that we can apply it while keeping our eyes firmly on the issues that must matter to us 
as rational agents. Only a norm that is transparent will tell me: “Look, it does not matter whether 
you really manage to bring yourself to believe that your friend is in trouble. All that matters is whether 
he is. So you should use your evidence to establish, as well as you can, whether it is true that he is 
in trouble. Once this is settled, it does not matter whether you suffer from doxastic incontinence, 
or whether your evidence also allows you to establish higher-order claims about your evidence, etc.” 
Why do I claim that epistemic norms should accord with practical aims? There are two things 
one might say here. One thing would be that the normative status of epistemic norms is ultimately 
instrumental. Epistemic norms concerning practical reasoning serve the aim of conforming to our 
practical reasons. If this idea is adopted, a norm that gets in the way of conforming to our reasons 
would not have any weight at all. Another thing one could say is this: Even if epistemic norms are 
not just instrumentally but intrinsically important, it would still be intolerable if we had to decide 
whether we aim for conformity with our practical reasons or for conformity with epistemic norms. 
But isn’t the only norm that is transparent in my sense the Truth Norm? No. Let me explain.  
 
 
4. Introducing EMN 
 
The Knowledge Norm derives much intuitive support from ordinary discourse. Criticism in terms 
of knowledge, such as: “If you did not know whether p, how could you act as if p?” is very natural, 
and frequently encountered. But close attention to ordinary discourse reveals that there is a 
different way to formulate epistemic criticism, which is also very familiar. If someone is about to 
rely on p, a natural way to challenge her is to say that it might be that not p. E.g., if I go to the pub 
to meet a friend without having checked whether she will be there, it is natural to object by saying: 
“You should not just go there without calling. She might not be there!” My proposal takes this as 
a clue. I suggest an epistemic norm that demands that it is not the case that it might be that not-p:  
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 Epistemic Must Norm (EMN): Rely on p  only if   it must be that p. 
 
Of course, there is an orthodox semantic analysis of epistemic operators on which EMN does not 
really differ from the Knowledge Norm. According to this analysis, epistemic “must” is used to 
say that the content it embeds is entailed by what is known – and thus, according to typical 
assumptions about closure, itself known. This, I suspect, explains why the possibility of epistemic 
criticism in modal terms has not, so far, been considered worthy of investigation in its own right.  
This conclusion would be premature. As I argue in the next section, other analyses of 
“might” and “must” are available. If correct, they can explain why my proposal is an improvement.  
But first, let me be very clear about what the challenge is. Compare the following conditions: 
 
 Accuracy:   Rely on p (if and) only if  p. 
 
 Knowledge Norm:  Rely on p only if  you know that p.  
 Justified Belief Norm: Rely on p only if  you justifiably believe that p. 
 Sensitive Belief Norm: Rely on p  only if  your belief that p is sensitive. 
 … 
 EMN:    Rely on p only if  it must be that p. 
 
Evidently, the right-hand sides of the candidate epistemic norms impose additional constraints on 
relying on p, as compared to the right-hand side of Accuracy. And of course, this is not a bug but 
a feature. As I said, there seems to be something objectionable about acting on lucky guesses where 
much is at stake. But the problems I raised for candidates like the Knowledge Norm, the Justified 
Belief Norm, etc. was that the additional constraints imposed are not transparent – i.e., that they can 
be confirmed or disconfirmed by considerations that do not, in the same way, confirm or 
disconfirm what we should see as the only practically relevant criterion: the truth of the premise p. 
My claim is that EMN does better in this regard. The right-hand side of EMN, while not 
logically equivalent to the right-hand side of Accuracy, does satisfy Transparency. How can this 
be? Well, to see how EMN satisfies Transparency, we need to know what “must” adds to the 
condition on the right-hand side. Clearly, there had better be some sense in which it does not add 




5. Non-Factualism about Epistemic Modals 
 
Recent work on epistemic modals has converged on claims that support my proposal. A sample: 
 
 “If a modal µ is used in an epistemic sense and combined with a sentence s, the resulting  
 µ-s does not differ from s in content.” (Schnieder 2010, 603) 
  
“When I say, ‘Bob might be in his office,’ I am talking about Bob and his office, not myself 
or the extent of my information.” (Yablo 2011, 271) 
  
“[T]he question of whether ¯f is ‘transparent’, as it were, to the question of whether f. 
[…] Believing that f and believing that ¯f are states of mind supported by reasons of the 
same category.” (Yalcin 2011, 308) 
 
However, to vindicate claims like these, the authors must part ways with the orthodox treatment 
of modals (mentioned earlier) – the treatment given, e.g., in Kratzer’s (1981) influential work. 
According to this view, £p, as uttered in a context c, is true in a world w iff for all worlds w’ that 
are epistemically accessible from w (in a way determined by c), p holds true. To specify it formally: 
    




⟦¯p⟧c,w = 1  iff  $w’ (wRcw’ Ù w’Îp) 
 
On this view, a statement like “it must be that p” makes a claim about an epistemic state of affairs. 
(Notice that the right-hand side is essentially equivalent to the analysis of knowledge ascriptions in 
Hintikka 1962.) It says that in w, what some relevant subject knows entails that p. Accordingly, this 
statement is true or false relative to a world depending on how things stand knowledge-wise (or 
evidence-wise) in that world. It does not directly concern how things stand p-wise in that world. 
What alternatives could one offer to capture the fact that the subject matter of £p and ¯p 
is p, as the quotations above suggest? There is a variety of approaches. I merely mention one major 
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proposal, namely Yalcin’s (2007) so-called domain semantics.9 It differs from the orthodox account 
in that sentences are interpreted relative to not two but three parameters – a context c, world w, 
and information state s (where an information state is a set of worlds modelling a body of 
information). The semantics for epistemic “must” and “may” then takes the following form:  
 
⟦£p⟧c,s,w = 1  iff "w’ Î s : ⟦p⟧c,s,w’ = 1 
and 
⟦¯p⟧c,s,w = 1  iff  $w’ Î s : ⟦p⟧c,s,w’ = 1. 
 
The important thing to note is that the world w makes no appearance on the right-hand sides. That 
is: How things stand in w – knowledge-, evidence- or otherwise (!) – does not matter for the truth 
of £p or ¯p in w. So these modals are quantifiers over a domain of worlds which is not determined 
by facts in the evaluation-world, via any notion of accessibility. Instead, Yalcin treats s as an 
autonomous parameter, which is fixed independently of the w-parameter. That is, given some state 
of information, all worlds w will be worlds with regard to which £p or ¯p have the same value.  
What does this mean? It means that there are no £p-facts or £p-worlds, nor ¯p-facts or 
¯p-worlds, in the sense in which there are p-facts or p-worlds. In other words, there is no particular 
way for an individual world to be such that it, specifically, renders £p or ¯p true. In still other 
words, this means that the contents £p and ¯p are not propositions (at least in any usual sense). 
What do these statements express, then? Yalcin adopts an idea from Veltman (1996): They 
perform a kind of test on a given information state. They deliver 1 if we find that the state is such 
that it contains only (or, for ¯, some) p-worlds and 0 otherwise. We might, accordingly, treat them 
as expressing properties or characteristic functions of information states, not of individual worlds. 
How does this proposal explain the above intuitions about the subject matter of p and £p? 
To see this, consider the process of inquiry (modeled along the lines of Stalnaker 1984). When we 
try to establish whether p, we check whether there are any possible non-p worlds which, for all we 
can tell, may be actual. We sort through the possibilities we cannot rule out, with an eye to whether 
p is true in them. On Yalcin’s account, the same thing should happen when we inquire whether to 
accept a claim that £p. We inquire whether our information state has the property of having only 
p-elements. This inquiry is – exactly: a sorting through live possibilities with an eye to whether p! 
The reason for this, again, is that on Yalcin’s view, £p is not a claim about some information state. 
																																																								
9 As Yalcin notes, his account is indebted in many respects to the update semantics of Veltman (1996) (see also Willer 
2013), which could have served as an example equally well. 
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So we do not have to evaluate claims about what our information state with regard to p is. Our 
information state is not part of the content but part of the index relative to which the content is 
evaluated. This is why the processes of inquiring whether £p and of inquiring whether p coincide. 
Contrast: According to the earlier orthodoxy, something quite different happens. We inquire 
whether there are any possible worlds which, for all we can tell, may be actual in which it is not 
known that p, or in which the relevant evidence does not establish p. So we go through the live possibilities 
with a very different set of criteria, and a very different question in mind. We sort through the 
worlds with an eye to what the facts about someone’s epistemic position in them are. (In a 
framework of accessibility relations, this means that we check the worlds in our information state 
with an eye to whether certain other worlds are p-worlds – namely those that are epistemically 
accessible from those former worlds. This is a different endeavor with possibly different results.) 
In this way, Yalcin’s domain semantics can account for the intuitions voiced in the quotes 
above. However, some authors have objected that this may be too much of a success, so to speak. 
This is because logical systems that develop the basic intuitions of a domain semantics (as well as 
an update semantics) validate a very strong principle, according to which p logically entails £p. Many 
authors have criticized this feature. Schulz (2010a), for example, observes that it often seems to be 
rationally permissible to be rather confident that p while also being virtually certain that it is not 
the case that £p. Given that logical entailment should preserve rational certainty, this is a problem.  
I am not entirely convinced that this problem is unsurmountable, in part because I think that 
epistemic “must” has uses that do not have quite the strength that the objection ascribes to it (see 
below). I cannot adjudicate between competing semantic accounts of epistemic modals here. I 
merely point out that critics like Schulz (2010b) have proposed alternative semantic theories which 
likewise preserve the non-factualist intuitions, and which thus support my proposal equally well. 
On all these semantic views EMN satisfies Transparency in some version. They agree that 
any evidence that bears on whether £p will have to be evidence that bears on whether p. Of course, 
if there is no proposition that £p, we should not say that evidence for p is evidence for £p. What we 
should say instead is that any consideration can have an epistemic impact on our conviction that 
£p only in virtue of providing evidence for p.10 Also, on the domain semantics, £p will not express 
a content for which a probability function is defined, so we cannot use the Probabilistic Version 
(as I said). If we adopt Schulz’s view, however, we can. On his view, we can meaningfully speak of 
the probability of £p. And indeed a consideration can affect the probability of £p only by virtue 
of affecting the probability of p. In any case, the idea behind Transparency will surely be satisfied. 
																																																								
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting this clarificatory remark. 
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On all views, inquiring whether Bob must be in his office is not a different project from 
inquiring whether he is in his office. The same evidence matters in either case, and in the same 
way. And in neither case do we pay special attention to evidence about our evidence, or to theories 
of knowledge, etc. (Or, to put it more carefully: Cases in which EMN will require us to consider 
such higher-level questions will be precisely those cases, if any, in which we need to consider these 
questions even to determine the first-order question whether Bob is in his office. Consequentially, 
there will be no asymmetry in how higher levels matter to the inquiries whether p and whether £p.) 
This, in a nutshell, is what makes it possible for the epistemic modal norm to be transparent, 
as defined above. Although the condition it imposes is not the same as in the case of the Truth 
Norm, the processes of inquiring whether the Epistemic Must Norm is satisfied and the process 
of inquiring whether the Truth Norm is satisfied will coincide, and so respond to the same reasons. 
My proposed EMN is to be understood as using “must” (or £) in the sense that the semantic 
proposals just outlined aim to capture. Although these proposals differ in important respects, they 
also agree on certain basic questions – especially on those that relate to Transparency. Now, I do 
think that some such proposal will turn out to be more adequate as an account of natural language 
epistemic modals than the orthodox one – but, of course, I cannot argue for this here. At any rate, 
the norm I mean to suggest should be understood as having an operator of the kind just discussed.    
 
 
6. Some Clarifications    
 
Let me further characterize the EMN (which, again, tells us to rely on p only if £p) by contrasting 
it with other norms. One first important point is that the EMN differs from the Truth Norm. It is 
perfectly possible that p but that not £p, in which case it is not correct to rely on p. Note well that 
this is not a matter of secondary propriety, i.e. reasonableness. It is not that we are excused for not 
relying on p. It would not have been correct to do so – we would have needed an excuse for that. 
As I have indicated earlier in this paper, I do consider this an important advantage of EMN 
over the Truth Norm. The crucial test case, to my mind, is the case of a lucky guess. As far as my 
intuitions go, for a subject to rely on a lucky guess in an important decision is not proper on any 
level. Defenders of the Truth Norm, however, must claim that the impropriety is merely of the 
secondary kind – that the subject deserves blame, but that she has still, unknowingly, reasoned as 
she should have. EMN yields the more plausible verdict that she should not have reasoned this way.    
What about the Knowledge Norm? If £p is true on our information, does that mean we 
know that p? Not necessarily. In the framework of a domain semantics (or a dynamic semantics), 
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it all depends on the exact view we take on information states. It is, in fact, possible to stipulate 
that a subject’s information state consists of what she knows. In this case (and assuming that 
knowledge is closed under entailment), £p will indeed be true, relative to a subject’s information, 
iff that subject knows that p. But even if this should be our choice, it is crucial to bear in mind that 
£p still does not state or report the fact that the subject knows that p. As I keep insisting, £p 
expresses a condition that, unlike a knowledge claim, is transparent to p (in the sense explained).  
More importantly, however, we do not have to make this assumption about information 
states. In fact, in a basic domain or update semantics it is not even guaranteed that £p is factive. If 
we wanted to guarantee this, we would have to formulate an additional constraint on information 
states. Using the language of the orthodox framework of accessibility relations, this condition is 
often called Reflexivity. Reflexivity says that for all information states s, the actual world is among 
the elements of s. (This, of course, amounts to a factive understanding of information: If we think 
of s as the intersection of all the propositions that constitute a body of information, Reflexivity 
amounts to the requirement that all of these propositions have to be true in the actual world.) 
Should we embrace Reflexivity and thus the factivity of £p? This is a controversial question. 
As far as intuitions about the meaning of epistemic “must” in natural languages are concerned, 
opinions are sharply divided. Traditionally, many authors in philosophy seem to be drawn to a 
strong, factive reading of “must.” By contrast, many authors in linguistics insist that “must p” is 
often weaker than “p”. Especially, they put emphasis on the fact that we seem to use “must” 
precisely in contexts where there seems to be some residual uncertainty. To take an example (from 
Mihoc et al. 2019): Suppose Jo is looking for Anna. She has just confirmed that it is 7 pm, and she 
knows that at 7 pm Anna is typically home. Here, Jo can perfectly well say: “Anna must be home 
now,” although she cannot flat-out assert that Anna is home now. The epistemic modal claim 
seems to quite clearly allow for some possibility of error. Consequently, Kratzer’s (1981) influential 
account models epistemic modals as quantifiers over a domain that is defined, not just by the 
propositions that one knows (in the so-called modal base) but in addition by best fit with 
propositions about what is normally the case (in a stereotypical ordering source). There is no reason 
why update and domain semantics cannot introduce analogous restrictions on information states. 
I think as far as natural language is concerned, the jury is still out on whether “must” is factive 
or not.11 But I stipulate that whether or not it is ultimately the best way to understand “must” in 
English, in the EMN “must” or £ should be stipulated to be non-factive. My main motivation for 
this proposal is simply that I find much to recommend in non-factive candidates for epistemic 
																																																								
11 For a good overview of the debate and some experimental evidence supporting Kratzer’s restricted quantification 
account, see Del Pinal and Wadlon (2019). 
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norms of practical reasoning. As many authors observe, where a subject has excellent evidence for 
p, it often seems that relying on p is not just excusable but the thing to do, even if p is false. So I 
opt for an understanding of EMN that is non-factive.12 This makes for a plausible epistemic norm.13 
EMN will call for further choices. An especially important one concerns the selection of the 
relevant information state. When we ask whether a subject satisfies EMN, do we evaluate the 
relevant modal claim relative to her information, or to ours, or some third thing? I will not commit 
to a specific proposal here. But I do think that an attractive solution will be to let context determine 
the relevant state. So it may be the case that in the context of the subject, it is correct to judge that 
she ought not to rely on p, while in the context of better informed eavesdroppers it is correct to 
judge that it would be proper for the subject to rely on p. Of course, there is a danger in this 
proposal. As MacFarlane (2014, 103 f) points out in a related context, no agent can be expected to 
guide herself by so many divergent norms at once. But this danger can be averted (as MacFarlane 
also notes) if we privilege certain contexts and information states for certain purposes. I will here 
do so by privileging the agent’s information in the secondary norm, to be discussed below. The 
consequence is this: An agent may often be well aware that different points of view may differ on 
whether she should rely on p. This is not actually implausible, I think, as long as the agent can tell 
what is legitimately expected of her, what she will be blamed and held accountable for, etc. This 
will be fixed by the secondary norm, which requires that she guide herself by her own information. 
    
 
7. EMN and a Modal Norm of Secondary Propriety    
 
My proposal is not yet complete. I have not ensured that EMN will escape the second problem 
mentioned above – i.e., the Problem of Level Confusions. After all: If £p semantically expresses 
a property of our information state, will Reasonableness not require higher-order evidence about 
properties of our information state? And will that not re-introduce the “philosophical” worries?  
																																																								
12 Does this sit well with Accuracy? If our aim must be rely on p iff p, how can the adequate norm be non-factive? As 
I said, practical aims are not usually taken to translate directly into practical norms. What we expect of agents is to rely 
on p depending on whether their perspective suggests that this will satisfy Practical Aim – and that may very well be 
the case even if Practical Aim is not in fact satisfied. 
13 Although it may seem otherwise at first glance, Schulz’s theory grants us a similar freedom. In his theory, much 
depends on what it means to have a rational credence of 1. Many authors think that it is hardly ever rational to have 
such a credence. This cannot be what Schulz has in mind. In fact, he mentions that the relevant probability function 
will often be one that would result from updating with “negations of sentences we do not know to be false” (Schulz 
2010b, 372). Given this, we again have the possibility to say that “must” allows for a possibility of error. 
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Yes. But I mean to propose something more. I propose that we use epistemic modals not 
just in the primary norm but also in the secondary norm. More specifically, I propose the following: 
  
Epistemic Modal Reasonableness (EMR) 
If a norm says that a subject ought to rely on that p only if condition c holds, the subject is 
reasonable (with regard to that norm) in relying on that p iff given the information of the 
subject, it must be that c holds. 
 
For many primary epistemic norms, this pretty much coincides with the notion of Reasonableness 
described above. For instance: To be reasonable in the modal sense with regard to the Knowledge 
Norm, your information must be such that relative to it, it must be that you know the proposition 
in question. This will be so if your information establishes the epistemic fact that you know this. 
Roughly at least, this seems equivalent to the demand that you are justified in believing you know. 
Thus, EMR should enjoy much of the intuitive support of the previous norm of Reasonableness.   
Things are dramatically different if our primary norm is EMN. The crucial point is this: The 
Epistemic Must Norm is the fixed point of the secondary norm EMR. This is because on all the 
semantic views I have mentioned above, iterations of £ are logically vacuous – that is, the 
characteristic S4 axiom (£p ® ££p) is validated. In fact, typical versions of the semantics claim 
that £ and ¯ satisfy the axioms of the modal logic S5 (see Yalcin 2007, 994; Willer 2013, 12; 
Schulz 2010b, 381 ff); since I have opted against factivity, this is not true for the operator in EMN. 
Since iterations of £ are vacuous, the condition expressed by EMN is guaranteed to be 
luminous. If it must be that p, it must be that it must be that p. And, as I said, both conditions are 
associated with processes of inquiry that focus on whether p. To establish whether it must be that 
it must be that p, you do what you do when you establish whether it must be that p, which, again, 
is just what you do when you establish whether p. That means: To be reasonable in the light of 
EMN, you need not ask higher-level epistemological questions. You must only inquire whether p! 
In other words: Given a modalized notion of reasonableness, EMN is primary and secondary 
norm at once. As we have seen, this is not because the secondary norm EMR is vacuous per se. In 
combination with other candidate norms, it imposes substantive constraints. But it is a notion of 
reasonableness which, when associated with the EMN, delivers the same criterion as the EMN. 
Importantly, EMR is, unlike EMN, explicitly tied to the subject’s body of information. As far as the 
primary norm, EMN, is concerned, I have allowed for contextual variability. But the very idea of a 
“secondary” norm is to take into account, specifically, the nature of the subject’s own perspective.  
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For example: Suppose that Emily is on her way to a concert, and she is already late. Alas, she 
feels insecure about whether she turned off the stove. Should she head on to the concert, relying 
on the premise that it is off? In Emily’s context, EMN permits this iff (given Emily’s information) 
the stove must be off. We can imagine that she used the stove before she left, that she has not 
checked whether it is off, and that she has a track record of sometimes leaving it on. In this case, 
her evidence does not license the claim that it must be off. Unable to rely on that premise, she 
returns. At the same time, an eavesdropper watches her, unable to interfere and communicate with 
her. This eavesdropper is better informed. She can tell that there is no way that the stove is on. So 
she can say: “Oh no, poor Emily. She should have relied on proposition that the stove is off, 
because in fact it must be off. However, I do not blame her. It was reasonable to return; given her 
information, the stove might be on.” I find this combination of judgments extremely plausible. 
Note that when we judge EM-reasonableness, the prefix that determines the subject’s 
information as the relevant information state will take wide scope over both occurrences of “must”. 
So when we ask whether Emily is reasonable in relying on a proposition p, we ask whether it must 
be (relative to Emily’s information) that it must be (relative to Emily’s information) that p. Since 
the state is not allowed to “switch” midway in the interpretation, this iteration of modals is again 
vacuous. So in effect, my proposal says that when we contrast what Emily should treat as a reason, 
and what she would be reasonable to treat as a reason, we are contrasting two “must” claims, one 
“autocentric” (relativized to our own information) and one “exocentric” (relativized to Emily’s). 
Consequently, the distinction between primary and secondary propriety will matter only from 
a third-person point of view (as they say), i.e. from contexts with different amounts of information. 
Within the “egocentric” predicament, by contrast, the distinction collapses, since the subject will 
always ask what must be the case relative to her information. Accordingly, Kvanvig’s worry does 
not arise. The reasoning subject will never face the task of guiding herself by two divergent norms.  
 
 
8. Modal and Probabilistic Reasons  
 
Often, reasons on which we act are themselves modalized (in an epistemic sense), e.g. when we 
decide to go downstairs because the keys might be on the kitchen sideboard. One corollary of my 
proposal concerns these cases: Any epistemic modal claim which is true (relative to the information 
state of the reasoner) automatically passes the norms, EMN and EMR. So if a reason is itself about 
what might or must be the case, both of my epistemic norms will coincide with the Truth Norm. 
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Reasoning under uncertainty is naturally conducted in terms of what might or must be the 
case. These, I suggest, provide ways for us to frame considerations that we can treat as epistemic 
fixed points, since they will, if true, automatically pass the primary and secondary epistemic norms. 
One last thing I wish to discuss concerns probabilities. I am sympathetic to the view that much 
of our reasoning involves credences, i.e. probabilistic degrees of belief, rather than simple yes-or-
no premise states. But many authors assume that probabilistic contents do not felicitously embed 
under epistemic modals. How can we apply EMN to probabilistic inputs to practical reasoning?  
One option is to take inspiration from defenses of the Knowledge Norm. Stanley and 
Hawthorne suggest that credences pass their norm iff corresponding propositions about epistemic 
probabilities are known. But if I adopted this proposal, this would mean that in many cases, we are 
stuck with a need for higher-order evidence again. (Often we would have to check whether it must 
be that it is epistemically likely that p, or the like.) Transparency would be out of the window. 
But there may be better options. Moss (2017) has argued that thoroughly probabilistic 
contents (and not just propositions about epistemic probabilities) do embed under epistemic 
modals, and she has developed a semantic theory to allow for such embeddings. As before, I can 
only give the briefest of sketches. The general idea is that epistemic modals are actually evaluated 
relative to a pair of an information state and a partition on this state. This partition gives alternative 
hypotheses, or a question. Epistemic modals do not quantify directly over worlds but over cells in 
the partition. And “It must be probable that p” will mean that for all hypotheses (cells) in the 
partition, if we update our credence with that hypothesis the result will be a probability of p >.5.  
Adopting some such proposal would make EMN and EMR apply even to probabilistic 
contents. And Transparency, it seems to me, would be respected. We accept “It must be that it is 
probable that p” simply by being credally related to p in the right way, such that whatever 
assumption (out of a certain range) we make, we become or remain more than .5 sure that p is true.  
 
 
 9. Knowledge Again 
 
I have argued that knowledge is not the norm of practical reasoning, and that the correct norm 
uses epistemic modals. Of course, I had to leave many questions unaddressed. I briefly mention 
one. I have granted that the Knowledge Norm derives support from ordinary discourse. Epistemic 
criticism is often framed in terms of knowledge. If my account is correct, why would this be so? 
Though I cannot discuss this question at length, I will at least hint at a possible answer. As I 
said, orthodox semantic views assimilate epistemic modals to knowledge claims (see § 5 above). 
	 22	
But I think that for many ordinary uses, this direction should actually be reversed. Many instances 
of knowledge claims in ordinary discourse should be understood as very similar to epistemic modal 
claims (on their non-factualist construal), not vice versa. Here is what I have in mind: In other work 
(Henning 2018), I argue that certain attitude verbs (like “believe” and “want”) have parenthetical 
readings. That is, in many uses of sentences of the form “S believes thar p”, the matrix clause “S 
believes that” semantically contributes a backgrounded side-remark, while the embedded clause 
“p” contributes the so-called at-issue content. The idea would be that “know” also has parenthetical 
uses in this sense. Empirical work in linguistics suggests precisely this (see, e.g., Simons 2007).  
So my hypothesis would be the following: A criticism like “You do not even know whether 
your friend is at the pub” must be interpreted as “For all you know, your friend is not at the pub.” 
In this last construction, as in “Your friend might not be at the pub”, the at-issue content concerns 
the whereabouts of your friend, not your epistemic state (which is subject of a side-remark.) 
Parenthetical uses of this kind are, in important respects, to be treated like epistemic modal claims.  
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